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10/12/2003 | Conference at the American Enterprise Institute. Catastrophe in Chechnya: Escaping the Quagmire. Zbigniew Brzezinski Keynote Remarks |
Zbigniew Brzezinski Keynote Remarks December 10, 2004 Unedited transcript prepared from a tape recording MR. SIKORSKI: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm Radek Sikorski again. It's my great pleasure and honor to introduce our keynote speaker today. Actually, who am I to introduce in Washington such a well-known Washington figure as Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former National Security Adviser. His list of publications and accomplishments is very long, and you're perhaps more familiar with it even than I am. But I'll say that he has at least two particular claims to speak on this subject to us today, in addition to being one of the moving forces behind the U.S. Committee for Peace on Chechnya, namely, that as a member of the Carter administration, Dr. Brzezinski was instrumental in bringing about the Helsinki process, the embedding of the idea of human rights in the international discourse, and we are here today on the International Day of Human Rights. And that was not only moral, it was also effective. That, in combination with the Reagan policies of the 1980s, helped to bring about the collapse of Soviet tyranny. And, secondly, Dr. Brzezinski is also no stranger to impossible situations, to bringing peace where no peace seems to be possible, and he, of course, was a key figure in bringing about peace between Israel and Egypt. Dr. Brzezinski, we are very honored to have you. I only have one regret that I cannot address him today as the President of Poland, for which I wanted him to run, but thanks for that, we have the privilege of having you speak today. Please. [Applause.] MR. BRZEZINSKI: Thank you very much, Radek. Somehow, rather, I feel more comfortable speaking here as a resident of Washington than as an occasional visitor in state to Washington. So thanks very much for the compliment, but I'm happy to be here on my own credentials, so to speak. First of all, I do want to congratulate the organizers of this conference. I have been somewhat involved in this issue now for almost a decade, and I think this is the most impressive undertaking of this sort here in Washington that I have witnessed. And I think it is to the credit of the organizers of this conference, the various institutions that have collectively undertaken this effort, but perhaps it has also a wider significance, namely, that there is a maturing recognition that this is not some isolated, remote, perhaps tragic but ultimately trivial issue that can be ignored. And that is all to the good. Secondly, by way of preface, I also want to say that I was very impressed by this morning's discussions that covered a number of important facets of this issue. They touched on a number of centrally important developments. They explored the potential meaning of some mysteries that are yet to be fully unraveled, but which testify to the byzantine complexity of this issue. In that sense, these discussions were informative, enlightening, provocative. And I asked myself yesterday, in thinking as to what I might contribute to this discussion, what is it that I should focus on, what is it that I can really add, given the presence of so many experts, people with a direct sense of involvement, some people with direct involvement, what can I really add. And, ultimately, I decided that perhaps the most I can do is to share with you some reflections regarding two issues: The first is maybe somewhat subjective. Why should one care? Why do I care? And then, secondly, what next? Why do I care? Because I do care. I have been involved in this issue now for a decade. And I care because I'm very much a child of the second half of the 20th century, and I'm very much aware of the fact that the 20th century was, in fact, the most lethal century in the history of mankind. It was a century in which more people died by deliberate design of others in the name of a variety of passions than in the entire human history. Literally, if you actually total up the numbers, more people were deliberately killed in that century than in all of the centuries preceding it. That is a staggering statistic. And it was a century of unprecedented cruelty to the most defenseless. And anyone who lived through that has to be sensitive to the moral imperative that this implies. And who were the principal victims? I think we can say, with a painful statistical accuracy, that the principal victims, if we were to rank them, were the Jews, all of whom were destined to be killed if even not all were killed, but they were destined to be killed. Secondly, the Gypsies, all of whom were destined to be killed, even if not all of them were killed. And thirdly, the Chechens, actually the Chechens. Because if one considers the fact that in 1944, after 100 years of repression, they were chosen to be eliminated as a nation, which means uprooted from their soil and deported in the midst of a cold winter to an alien territory, in the process of which half of them, almost, died--men, women, and children--it closely approximates what happened to the Jews and the Gypsies, even in terms of statistical proportions. Roughly one-half of the population perished. And since the 1990s, how many more have died? We hear different estimates. But, by and large, I think there is consensus that probably somewhere in the range of a quarter of the total died--not by accident, not by earthquakes, not by climatically induced starvation, but from the hands of others, deliberately. And how did they die? They died like the Gypsies, like the Jews: amidst global silence, in solitude, with occasionally some people murmuring, "Never again," but not really attaching much significance to that. So I think there is something very significant about what we were discussing here today, and that is one of the reasons why I think we all probably agree that we should care. And that is the first reason. But there is a second reason why I care, and that is because what that issue, in my view, tells us about what is happening in America, and that is of enormous importance to me as an American. Notice who's absent here today. We invited a number of official Russian speakers, and none of them came, although we will have a guest from the Russian Embassy, and we are grateful for that. We also invited a series of senior U.S. officials, whose names I will not list, but who didn't come and most of whom did not even respond. We are fortunate to have one official with us, but I cannot say that the U.S. Government is massively represented here today. And I wonder whether that doesn't tell us something about the moral issue at stake. If I have to look at American policy towards the issue of Chechnya, from the onset of the Chechen dilemmas almost a decade ago to today, I would say that, by and large, we have seen an evolution from initial ignorance to self-preoccupied indifference. Initial ignorance reflected in the remarkable statement by the President of the United States that the conflict in Chechnya is like the American Civil War, which I think most charitably can be described as a ignorant statement. But now we have self-preoccupied indifference because we know that the subsequent President actually knows better. He actually knows better. So we're not dealing with indifference. We're not dealing with ignorance. We're dealing with a tactical expediency. After 9/11, it is better to sweep this issue under the rug, even though we know better. There is an interview conducted by Jim Lehrer with our highest spokesman and political as well as, I assume, moral leader, and he is asked by Jim Lehrer, "What should we do about the Chechnya issue?" I quote from an interview in October of the year 2000, that is to say, an electoral year. Lehrer says, "Should we hold up International Monetary Fund aid? Anything else we should do?" The answer: "Export-import loans." Lehrer: "And just cut them off?" Answer: "Yes, sir, I think we should." Lehrer: "Until they do what?" Answer: "Until they understand the need to resolve the dispute peacefully and stop bombing women and children and causing large numbers of refugees to flee Chechnya." Lehrer: "And you think that would work?" Answer: "Well, it certainly worked better than what the Clinton administration has tried." So we cannot plead ignorance at the highest level. We know what is at stake. We know what perhaps should have been done. But we don't. And, in fact, I think there's no doubt that this whole issue has been exploited in the wake of 9/11 by a Russian leadership that has known how to use a particular turnkey phrase, a particular turnkey word: "terrorism." "Terrorism"--it's almost like producing a Pavlovian reaction. And that has been tactically employed a great deal in a setting of what I'm afraid is a case of bureaucratic cowardice. I once discussed this issue at the highest level--not quite the highest level--a very high level with a very senior official. The question of terrorism came up, and I said, "Yes, terrorism is abhorrent and clearly has to be denounced." "But what about the carpet bombing and shelling of Grozny in order to kill thousands of civilians in order to intimidate the opponent? Isn't that terror?" And then after a brief, hesitant pause, I was told, "Well, that's not terror. That's using force." [Laughter.] MR. BRZEZINSKI: A distinction which somewhat escaped me. There is even a bureaucratic example of what I am afraid is a case of bureaucratic cowardice, exemplified by the striking contrast in the manner that the Danes and the Brits, the British, have recently handled the case of Zakayev, the spokesman for the Chechens in Western Europe, active on behalf of a peaceful solution, and the way the U.S. Government has handled the very similar case of Ilyas Akhmadov, the Foreign Minister of the Chechens, who has been similarly seeking a peaceful outcome internationally and here in the United States. And some of you here know his proposal called the Akhmadov Plan. It is quite clear that the Russian Government, and notably Putin, would like to silence both because if they are silent, it is easier to reduce the problem into the Manikean (ph) black and white categories: good guys against terrorists. And Chechens who promote peace and compromise are inconvenient. The Russians tried to extradite Zakayev from the Danes. The Danes in short order rebuffed the extradition demand, dismissing it as ludicrous. Then the Russians tried with the British. The British, in the course of a few months' court procedure, ultimately did the same, exposing the evidence the Russians have offered as fraudulent, denounced the Russians for the use of torture, even in so-called judicial procedures, and then entirely on their own followed up by unilaterally granting asylum to Zakayev. And the United States, when Akhmadov asked for asylum, the USG bucked the process to the INS, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, instead of taking a stand on its own, for which discretionary authority exists. It has lingered for months in the INS, literally lingered for months. And then finally, after a hearing at the initial level, a positive recommendation for granting asylum was made and was shortly thereafter reversed at a higher level by a higher instance. Not only reversed, but when the issue was then moved into the courts, which under our system is an option, the U.S. Government has repeatedly caused the entire process to be delayed month after month, pleading that it is not ready to make its negative case, but insisting on its negative stand. In the meantime, I may add, his family has been stuck abroad for months and months in the Southern Caucasus, and a newly born but handicapped child was denied effective medical treatment as a consequence, and the family was not permitted to come to the United States. I may add, all of that in the face of appeals, written and signed by people like Lubbers, whom you heard this morning, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; Senator McCain to Tom Ridge, who is now in charge, ultimately, of INS; Senator Kennedy; myself and some others; most, in fact, unanswered. Now, I repeat, in this particular case, it isn't the Russians who are doing this, as was the case with the Danes and the Brits. It is the USG that is doing it and relying, I may add, on Russian-supplied evidence that is strikingly reminiscent of some of the evidence that was submitted to the Danes and to the Brits. I think there is a lesson in this or a source of concern in this. That is to say, can we expect people who are denied hope to act in moderation? Are we perhaps not ourselves contributing to driving the Chechens into extremism? Aren't we doing essentially what Putin wants us to do? And don't we know from 20th century history that silence is sometimes de facto complicity? I think that's something that one needs to ask at a time when we are being challenged internationally, that we need to respond, but if we are to have credibility and moral authority, we have to stand for principle. [Applause.] MR. BRZEZINSKI: There is a third reason why I care and why I think people should care, and that is because of what Chechnya is doing to Russia. Now, someone might say this is hypocrisy, this is pretense, and I'm not going to put it in sentimental terms. I'm going to put it in starkly geopolitical terms. I think the Chechen issue is delaying the post-imperial transformation of Russia. It is not only delaying it, it is helping to reverse it. And this is why one should care. The Chechnya issue has some analogies--I emphasize the word "some" because analogies don't mean identity. It has some analogies, some similarities--some--to the Algeria issue that once stood in the way of the modernization, democratization, and Europeanization of France. And just ask yourselves, Where would France be today if the Algeria issue had not been resolved, if it was still being repressed, if the French were still claiming that Algeria is France and that ultimately Algerians are Frenchmen? It took a great man to resolve that issue, to cut the Gordian knot, to break with the past and to draw the conclusions that permitted France to be what it is. De Gaulle was a great man, figuratively and literally. Putin is not. He's a small man who's appealing to the worst instincts-- [Applause.] MR. BRZEZINSKI: He's a small man who's appealing to the worst instincts in his country, not to the best instincts in his country. And there are good instincts in Russia. There are courageous Russians who have stood for principle in a manner that few of us probably would have the daring to emulate, and we owe them a great debt. And they represent the future of Russia. And you know their names-- [Applause.] MR. BRZEZINSKI: --and they deserve our applause. But right now we are witnessing a retrogressive process in which Russia is being transformed into a petral(?) autocracy in a decaying social structure. It is, in terms of crime statistics, now one of the most violent countries in the world. There are comparative crime statistics on this which are staggering. It is a country locked into a territorial myth that obscures realistic judgments about reality, a territorial myth which is based on the notion that if you control a lot of territory, you're a great country. It is a very deceptive myth because it obscures appreciation of what in the modern age represents national greatness and national influence and national power. There was a very interesting book on this which has lately appeared to which I would like to draw your attention by Fiona Hill at Brookings on the consequences of so much of Russian population having been forcibly pushed in the Soviet era into economically misallocated cities located climatically in areas which are counterproductive to social development. But this notion of territorial myth and territorial integrity is deeply embedded in the Russian political psyche, and it prevents Russia from moving towards the modern age. I believe this will change because it is also my conviction that the Putin regime is the last gasp of the Soviet era. It is the last gasp of the Soviet era. [Applause.] MR. BRZEZINSKI: It is a regime based on the last graduating class of the KGB, of people privileged, intelligent, opportunity to travel and to read, accustomed to the holding of power, with a very nostalgic view of what power is, what prestige is. But if you meet the Russians behind that generation, Russians of the '30s and the '40s, you see a totally different outlook. And I predict with confidence that within a decade we're going to have a leader in Russia who probably will have gone to some business school in the United States, a cabinet in Russia in which they will be graduates of Western universities, and a political elite in Russia which will be as good as any. And that brings me to my concluding point. It's been said earlier that Russia cannot part from Chechnya and that independence is, therefore, out. I don't know how one can sustain that judgment indefinitely. It is an accurate description of today. But if Russia is to become a full member of the European Community, of the international community, if it is to be part of the West, if our strategic objective of drawing Russia in is to be accomplished, it will be a different Russia. It will be a different Russia in which its own greatness is defined in different terms, in which there is a greater understanding also that certain myths have outlived their day. A different Russia will have a different definition of what Russia is and what greatness is, and I think in that setting, if there is a people that doesn't wish to be part of Russia, the better part of wisdom will be to have a different relationship with those people. And I think our objective should be to make that happen--to make that happen--and it seems to me that means that, first of all, we have to keep this issue as part of the international agenda. It is not an issue to be swept under the rug. It is part of the long-term strategic agenda involving our own role in the world, our own sense of what we stand for in terms of principles, but it is also an important issue in terms of our relationship with Russia and the shaping of a new world system. And to keep that issue as part of the international agenda, two things specifically need to be pursued. The first is to keep emphasizing the international responsibility for preserving the fabric and the existence of the Chechen nation, because it is faced with the possibility of genocidal extinction. And that means maximizing the international efforts at relief, offering that relief even if it is not accepted by the Russian Government, making sure that the international community responds generously to the need to salvage the Chechen people as a people, to preserve their inner fabric of identity, so that what Stalin started in 1944 doesn't become reality as a consequence of what is happening today. [Applause.] MR. BRZEZINSKI: And, secondly, we have to keep on stressing the very simple proposition that if Russia wishes to be part of the West, it cannot come into the West with its imperial baggage, with the legacies of the past. There is no room in the Western community, in the Atlantic community, there is no room in the European Union for a country that is pursuing a colonialist policy in a genocidal fashion, whether intentionally or de facto. And we can argue whether that is an intentional policy, but we know that it is the case de facto. There is simply no room in the Western community for such a country. There is simply no room in the concept of democracy for such a reality to be accepted. And provided that is kept up in the forefront, it doesn't mean that other issues and other relationships have to be sacrificed, but it means being forthright, it means being honest, it means being clear. And that, after all, is the essential quality of leadership in the world. And if we're serious about our own role in the world, if we're serious what it is that we want Russia to become, and if we care about what it is that defines us as people, I think we will know what to do. Thank you. [Applause.] MR. SIKORSKI: We have about ten minutes for questions. Dr. Brzezinski has kindly agreed to take them. Please. MS. : My name is Alvina, and I am a student from Berkeley. I was wondering if you see any parallels between U.S.-Iraq war and Russia-Chechnya war? Can you comment on that, please? MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, there might be some parallels, but as I said earlier, parallels or similarities or analogies also implies some significant differences. I think the differences are more important than the parallels. The parallels may be disturbing, at least in terms of their potential. That is to say, if we dig ourselves into a situation in which we are unable to extract ourselves and in the meantime anti-American animus becomes dominant and the bloodshed becomes more widespread, then the parallels may increase in number. But certainly the differences are much more important. We did not go in to overrun Iraq and incorporate it into the United States. We didn't bomb Baghdad into smithereens. We didn't drive one-half to one-third of the Iraqi population out of the country, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So the differences are more important. MR. : Frank Corbin (ph) from the law firm of DeKiefer and Horgan. If the relationship between the Russian Federation and Chechnya were to change, what forms do you see that as possibly taking and what process would you see being required to achieve those forms? MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, I think it is important for the Russians to recognize that if they want to resolve the issue peacefully, they have to deal with those Chechens who have committed themselves to independence because it is their resistance that is a critical dimension of this whole issue. And I think we should be clear in our own stand that dealing with Mashkadov is a necessary precondition for resolving this process, because obviously the Russians want to marginalize any Chechen resistance and then to divide the Chechens as much as possible so that they can then say there is no party to the peace process, we have nobody to negotiate with, except people whom we create ourselves, like Adirov (ph). So I think recognition that there is a partner to the dispute is the point of departure. Having said that, one can also envisage a variety of transitional arrangements that might meet the more immediate current needs of both sides without fully satisfying either and which would require major concessions also on the part of the Chechens, provided there was also some sense of some eventual direction pointing to some outcome that might involve either some special status or some associate status or some connection with the Russian Federation. In brief, what we do need is a combination of a road map and a virtual accord, a little bit in parallel to another problem that we are confronting elsewhere but which is of a very different nature. There has to be some sense of direction and some broad definition of outcome, but perhaps with the realization that intermediate stages will be necessary and may, in fact, be prolonged. But we're not there yet, and not until the international community, and particularly the United States, takes a clearer posture on this issue so that the issue is part of the international discourse will there be any adjustment in the Russian position. Right now Putin probably feels that neither domestically nor internationally does he confront any need to make any adjustments. He has to be convinced that ultimately there is, and that can only happen if it is helped from the outside and also if in the long run change within Russia itself, and particularly the younger generation of Russians, begins to realize that certain aspects of the imperial past are simply not compatible with the current age. MR. : Steve Beegan (ph) with the Senate Majority Leader's office. Dr. Brzezinski, thank you for your remarks. I thought it was an excellent representation on the issue. My question to you is: You have suggested a couple of things that might be done by the United States Government. One is to introduce more candor into the relationship. You read the excerpts of discussions about using lending as leverage. Could you enumerate three or four things that you think the United States Government should do now in order to raise this pressure? You know the ideas out there related to Russian participation in institutions and so on. could you enumerate a few things specifically that we could do? MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, thank you. First of all, let me also say that you personally and your Senator have also shown significant interest in the issue that I discussed specifically, and that's both highly appreciated and is also symptomatic of the problem, that the problem still persists. With regard to what else could be done, I'll just cite one example. I mean, there are many others, but one I think is particularly pertinent at this stage, and that's the so-called G-7 or G-8. We have turned the G-8 into a ludicrous--ludicrous--undertaking because the whole concept behind the G-7 was that advanced democracies, rich, advanced democracies get together on the basis of shared values to discuss problems in common and to find solutions in common to shared problems. And we now have in it a government which is violating human rights, not only vis-a-vis Chechens but increasingly vis-a-vis its own people, by restricting freedom of the media, by manipulating elections, by pushing the clock back. Does it really belong in the G-8? It wouldn't cost us or anybody else much to make a change, to disinvite someone from that meeting. Don't kid ourselves. Let's not kid ourselves. They love to go to that meeting. They like to play up that role. Therefore, it's a value. It's a value which can be denied at very little cost to ourselves, but with a very significant learning effect. So that's another example, and perhaps the Senator can do something about that. MR. SIKORSKI: One or two more. MR. DANILOFF: Nick Daniloff of Northeastern University. We've heard here today that the Chechen resistance is fractured, that there is a part of it which is moderate, there is another part which is increasingly radicalized. We know that there are conflicts between Field Commander Basayev (ph) and President Maskhadov. If there are to be negotiations on a peaceful solution between Moscow and Chechnya, who is Moscow to negotiate with? MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, clearly, the moderates, clearly Maskhadov, and the sooner the better, because the longer the conflict lasts, the more likely the dynamics of the conflict will push in the direction of the extremists. That's the logic of this situation. Now, perhaps the unwillingness to negotiate at Maskhadov is derived from the deliberate desire to push the Chechens into a more and more extreme posture in order to discredit them and then to justify the absence of the negotiations. And I think that's a very legitimate suspicion. MS. : Anna Broadscale, (?) University. You have mentioned the myth of territorial integrity that is sustaining the war in Chechnya. It's an excellent point, I think, and probably it sustains the popular opinion. Don't you think that it's possible that the war in Chechnya has a very rational reasoning for that, and that is ultimately the Chechen oil? I am a little bit surprised that the issue of oil has not yet been mentioned at this conference. But ultimately it's the Chechen oil that probably is supporting the Russian Army at this point, and the Russian Army has a real stake in staying in Chechnya and using it for its natural resources. My question is: How do you see the resolution of this problem? MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I'm not quite sure that I entirely agree with your emphasis on the Chechen oil. There are some oil wells in Chechnya, and Chechnya has been an important point of transit, and it's, I think, undoubtedly true that the Russian military commanders, by siphoning off some of the local oil, are making profits for themselves. But in the larger scheme of things, in terms of the overall volume of production of oil in Russia, the production in Chechnya is very, very negligible. Very negligible, I mean, it just is simply not a major factor in terms of the overall potential of the Russian economy. http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.675/transcript.asp |
